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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
Title of Trustee
Johnson v. Best Manufacturing Co., Inc.' was a delictual action
for personal injuries brought against plaintiff's former employer, its
insurer, and a foreman. An exception of no right of action was inter-
posed by the foreman, who alleged that plaintiff had filed a petition
in bankruptcy, listing the present action in his schedule of assets, and
that the trustee in bankruptcy was thus the proper plaintiff. The
exception was overruled by the trial court on the ground that the
cause of action had not passed to plaintiff's trustee, and the court of
appeal affirmed on a different ground. Section 70a(5) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act provides:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . . shall . . . be vested
by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date
of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title
except insofar as it is to property which is held to be exempt, to
all the following kinds of property wherever located. . . (5) prop-
erty, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the
petition he could by any means have transferred or which might
have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against
him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered: Provided,
that rights of action ex delicto for libel, slander, injuries to the
person of the bankrupt or of a relative . . . shall not vest in the
trustee unless by the law of the State such rights of action are
subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration, or
other judicial process ....
A cause of action for personal injuries is governed by the proviso,
and will not pass to the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy unless state
law makes it subject to creditors' claims. Whether such a cause of
action can be seized by creditors on judicial process in Louisiana is
open to doubt. It is true that since 1960 the right to recover damages
for personal injuries has been classified as a property right,3 and that
seizure of pending actions is authorized.' However, it must be under-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 263 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
2. 11 U.S.C. § l10a(5) (1970) (Emphasis added.)
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.
4. LA. R.S. 13:3864-68 (1950).
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stood, as Professor Yiannopoulos has stated,5 that creditors may seize
only actions not strictly personal. The same authority adds:
For purposes of succession upon death, delictual actions involv-
ing claims for personal injuries or wrongful death were considered
under Louisiana jurisprudence prior to 1960 as strictly personal
... . It would seem that these actions, for the same reasons,
should be insusceptible of seizure or exercise by creditors. This
is the prevailing view in France . . . . Amended Article 2315 of
the Louisiana Civil Code declares that causes of action for per-
sonal injuries or wrongful death are 'property' rights . . . . It is
conceivable, however, that this legislative declaration refers ex-
clusively to the heritability of delictual causes of action and has
nothing to do with the rights of creditors.'
The court of appeal in affirming, held that although the cause of
action had passed to the trustee in bankruptcy, the bankrupt had
nonetheless been permitted to continue prosecution of the suit.7
EFFECT OF DISCHARGE
In Beneficial Finance Co. v. Kramer,8 the trial court annulled a
default judgment against a discharged bankrupt. The creditor had
begun action on a past-due note on October 7, 1970. The debtor
received his discharge in bankruptcy on November 6, 1970, and a
default judgment was confirmed against him on November 10, 1970.
On December 30, 1970 a garnishment was issued to enforce the judg-
ment, and it was not until April, 1971 that the debtor sought dis-
missal of the garnishment. Where a discharge in bankruptcy is ob-
tained prior to judgment against him, the debtor must plead the
discharge as an affirmative defense.' If he fails to do so, he may not
later use the discharge to bar enforcement of the judgment. 0 The
court of appeal accordingly reversed, and the garnishment was rein-
stated. As the court of appeal noted, bankruptcy here occurred before
the effective date of the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act,
which empower courts of bankruptcy to determine the dischargea-
bility of any debt, to render judgment for a non-dischargeable debt
5. 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 78 n.123 (1966).
6. Id.
7. See 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 70-28 (1971).
8. 270 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
9. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1005.
10. O'Neill v. D.H. Holmes Co., 232 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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and order enforcement, to nullify any judgment as a determination
of personal liability on a discharged debt, and to enjoin creditors from
suing on, or using any process to collect, a discharged debt."
DEBTS UNAFFECTED BY DISCHARGE
Section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act provides in part:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts . . . except such as . . . (2) are liabilities for
obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false represen-
tations, or for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining
an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially
false statement in writing respecting his financial condition made
or published or caused to be made or published in any manner
whatsoever with intent to deceive .... 12
Under the 1970 Bankruptcy Act amendments, if a petition in
bankruptcy was filed after December 18, 1970, the effect of the dis-
charge in bankruptcy upon particular claims is a matter to be deter-
mined by the bankruptcy court. If, however, bankruptcy happened
before the 1970 amendments took effect, the issue is still one for the
state courts.
Where a creditor brings action on a claim that was properly
scheduled in his debtor's bankruptcy and is met with a plea of dis-
charge in bankruptcy, the plaintiff has been required to show: "(1)
[t]hat defendant made false representations; (2) that these repre-
sentations were made with the intention of defrauding the plaintiff,
and (3) that the plaintiff relied upon and was misled by the false
pretenses or representations."'"
Cases of this sort naturally turn on an analysis of the facts. Three
such cases were considered by Louisiana appellate courts in 1972-73.
Friendly Finance Service-Eastgate, Inc. v. Nelson,'4 held that the
notes in suit were discharged as there had been no intent by the
debtor to defraud. King Finance Company of New Orleans, Inc. v.
Howard'5 held that the note in suit was discharged as the creditor had
not relied on the debtor's financial statement. By contrast, in King
Finance Company of New Orleans, Inc. v. Johnson,'6 where the court
found intent by the debtor to defraud and reliance by the creditor on
the financial statement, the debt was not discharged.
11. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 32f, 35c (1970).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1970).
13. Delatour v. Lala, 131 So. 211, 212 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
14. 271 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
15. 265 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
16. 265 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
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